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Abstract—Pricing multi-interval economic dispatch of electric
power under operational uncertainty is considered in this two-
part paper. Part I investigates dispatch-following incentives for
generators under the locational marginal pricing (LMP) and
temporal locational marginal pricing (TLMP) policies. Extend-
ing the theoretical results developed in Part I, Part II evaluates a
broader set of performance measures under a general network
model. For networks with power flow constraints, TLMP is
shown to have an energy-congestion-ramping price decompo-
sition. Under the one-shot dispatch and pricing model, this
decomposition leads to a nonnegative merchandising surplus
equal to the sum of congestion and ramping surpluses. It is also
shown that, comparing with LMP, TLMP imposes a penalty
on generators with limited ramping capabilities, thus giving
incentives for generators to reveal its ramping limit truthfully
and improve its ramping capacity. Several benchmark pricing
mechanisms are evaluated under the rolling-window dispatch
and pricing models. The performance measures considered are
the level of out-of-the-market uplifts, the revenue adequacy of
the system operator, consumer payment, generator profit, and
price volatility.
Index Terms—Multi-interval economic dispatch, look-ahead
dispatch, locational marginal pricing, general and partial equi-
librium, and dispatch-following incentives.
I. INTRODUCTION
This two-part paper addresses some of the open prob-
lems in pricing multi-interval dispatch subject to ramping
constraints and forecasting uncertainty. Part I focuses on
theoretical issues surrounding dispatch-following incentives
with two major conclusions. One is that, under the rolling-
window dispatch model, uniform-pricing schemes cannot
provide dispatch-following incentives that avoid out-of-the-
market uplifts. Because such uplifts are discriminative, price-
discrimination is necessary.
Another conclusion is that the temporal locational marginal
pricing (TLMP)—a generalization of locational marginal
pricing (LMP)—provides full dispatch-following incentives
that eliminate the need for any out-the-market settlement
under the rolling-window economic dispatch model and
arbitrary demand forecast accuracy.
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Providing dispatch-following incentive is only one of the
many measures that pricing mechanisms need to be evaluated
for adoption. This paper presents a study on a broader range
of issues relating to pricing multi-interval dispatch under a
more general network model.
We focus on two categories of performance measures. The
first is on incentive compatibilities specific to multi-interval
dispatch. One type of incentive is the degree for which a par-
ticular pricing mechanism provides the necessary dispatch-
following incentives for generators. Here we measure the lack
of dispatch incentives by the size of the (ex-post) lost-of-
opportunity (LOC) payment. The higher the LOC payment,
the greater the incentive for a generator to deviate from
the dispatch signal. The other type is the incentive for a
generator to reveal its ramping limits truthfully. If a generator
receives higher profit under a pricing mechanism by under-
reporting ramping capability, then the pricing mechanism not
only distorts the actual ramping ability of the system but also
discourages a generator from improving its ramping capacity.
The second category of performance measures is on the
revenue adequacy and social welfare distribution. We are par-
ticularly interested in whether a pricing mechanism ensures
the revenue adequacy of the independent system operator
(ISO). For multi-interval dispatch over a network with power
flow constraints, the revenue of the operator needs to cover
the generation cost, the cost of ramping-induced out-of-
the-market uplifts, and congestion rent. Since the operator
is regulated to be revenue-neutral, a revenue reconciliation
process typically redistributes the surplus or shortfall of the
system operator to its consumers. Thus the revenue adequacy
of the operator affects costs to consumers.
Different pricing mechanisms result in different allocations
of social welfare. A pricing scheme that yields higher gener-
ator profits may be more costly to consumers. In general, no
pricing mechanism dominates all others across a wide range
of performance measures. A regulator of public utility typi-
cally favors a pricing policy that guarantees the generators’
revenue adequacy while minimizing the cost to consumers.
Transparency and volatility are also relevant metrics for
evaluating pricing mechanisms. Uniform pricing schemes are
transparent and effective pricing signals for market partici-
pants. The use of out-of-the-market uplifts, however, affects
the transparency of uniform pricing. Nonuniform pricing, in
general, lacks transparency.
2A. Summary of results and related work
The main contribution of Part II is twofold. First, we
extend key theoretical results in Part I to a network setting in
Proposition 1-5. Whereas most theoretical results such as the
strong equilibrium property of TLMP generalize naturally to
systems with network constraints, we obtain new results that
demonstrate succinctly the spatial-temporal decomposition of
TLMP.
Proposition 2 gives an explicit decomposition of TLMP
into energy, congestion, and ramping prices, which shows
that TLMP is the sum of a public price in the form of loca-
tional marginal price (LMP) and a private ramping price; the
former is transparent to all participants, and the latter plays
the role of in-the-market discrimination among generators
with different ramping capabilities.
We show in Proposition 3 that, under the one-shot eco-
nomic dispatch model with perfect demand forecast, the
merchandising surplus under TLMP is positive and is equal
to the sum of the congestion surplus (congestion rent) and
ramping surplus defined by the surplus due to binding
ramping constraints. In contrast, Proposition 1 shows the
merchandising surplus of LMP covers only the congestion
rent. This result explains partially that the revenue of the
operator under LMP is often inadequate to cover the out-of-
the-market uplifts due to binding ramping constraints.
Proposition 3 also shows that payments to a generator
under LMP is higher than that to TLMP, implying that
TLMP imposes a penalty on generators for their inabilities
to ramp sufficiently. From the individual generator’s per-
spective, Proposition 4 shows that, under TLMP, a generator
with higher ramping limits receives higher payments than an
identical generator with limited ramping capability. This re-
sult partially explains that TLMP discourages under-reporting
ramping limits and encourages generators to improve ramp-
ing capability.
The second part of our contribution is the empirical
simulation studies on incentives, the revenue adequacy of
the ISO, consumer payments, and generator profits. We are
interested in particular in the effects of forecasting error and
congestions on these performance measures. We compared
several benchmark pricing schemes in the literature under the
rolling-window dispatch model: the classical multi-interval
LMP, TLMP, price preserving multi-interval pricing (PMP)
[3], [4], constraints-preserving multi-interval pricing (CMP)
[4], and multi-settlement LMP (MLMP) [5].
There is a fairly extensive literature on pricing multi-period
dispatch. See a summary of related work in Part I [6] and
references therein. The impact of multi-interval dispatch on
LMP was considered in [7]. The work most relevant to this
paper is the recent work of Hua et al. [4] and Zhao, Zheng,
and Litvinov [5] that articulate some of the critical issues and
set forth formal statements of investigation.
Proofs, some detailed derivations, and additional simu-
lations involving network constraints can be found in the
appendix at the end of this paper.
II. SYSTEM AND OPERATION MODELS
A. Generation, demand, and network models
We consider a power system with M buses under the
direct-current (DC) power flow model with line-flow con-
straints. We follow the same notations used in Part I, adding
bus indices as superscripts to relevant variables.
Without loss of generality, we assume that every bus has
N generators*. Let gmit be the dispatch of generator i at bus
m in interval t, gm[t] = (gm1t , · · · , g
m
Nt) the dispatch vector
at bus m, and g [t] = (g1[t], · · · , gM [t]) the dispatch vector
in interval t from all generators.
We assume that there is one aggregated inelastic demand
at each bus. For the demand at bus m, let dmt be the
actual demand in interval t, dˆmt the forecasted demand,
d[t] = (d1t , · · · , d
M
t ) the demand vector from all buses in
interval t, and dˆ[t] the forecast of d[t].
The spatial property of the power flow is governed by the
DC power flow model where the branch power flow vector
is a linear function of the net power injection (q [t] − d[t])
where q [t] = (q1t , · · · , q
M
t ) is the vector of bus generations,
and qmt =
∑
i g
m
it the total generation from bus m in t.
For a network with total B branches, the 2B-dimensional
vector z [t] of branch power flows† satisfies
z [t] = S(q [t]− d[t]),
where S is the 2B × (M − 1) shift-factor matrix‡.
B. The rolling-window dispatch model
The rolling-window economic dispatch (R-ED) policy
GR-ED is defined by a sequence of W -interval look-ahead
economic dispatch policies (GR-EDt , t = 1, · · · , T ).
At time t, GR-EDt solves the following W -interval economic
dispatch optimization using (i) the realized dispatch gR-ED[t−
1] in interval t− 1 and (ii) the load forecast (dˆ[t], · · · , dˆ[t+
W − 1]) in the next W intervals, assuming that the forecast
in the binding interval t is perfect, i.e., dˆ[t] = d[t].
GR-EDt : at time t,
minimize
{G=[gm
it
]}
Ft(G)
subject to: Network constraints:
λt′ :
∑M
m=1
∑N
i=1 g
m
it′ =
∑M
m=1 dˆ
m
t′ ,
φ[t′] : S(q [t′]− dˆ[t′]) ≤ c,
for all t ≤ t′ < t+W.
Generation constraints:
(µm
it′
, µ¯mit′ ) : −r
m
i ≤ g
m
i(t′+1) − g
m
it′ ≤ r¯
m
i ,
(ρm
it′
, ρ¯mit′) : 0 ≤ g
m
it′ ≤ g¯
m
i ,
for all m, t ≤ t′ < t+W .
Boundary ramping constraints:
µ¯mi(t−1) : g
m
it − g
R-ED
mi(t−1) ≤ r¯
m
i ,
µm
i(t−1)
: gR-ED
mi(t−1) − g
m
it ≤ r
m
i ,
(1)
*One use non-generating generators to make up total N generators by
setting the generation capacites to zero of such generators.
†Each branch has two directional power flows.
‡Matrix S can be made time varying without affecting the results.
3where G = [g [t], · · · , g[t + W − 1]] is the matrix of all
generation variables in the W -interval look-ahead window,
and Ft(G) is the total bid-in costs
Ft(G) :=
N∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
t+W−1∑
t′=t
fmit′(g
m
it′).
Here fmit′(·) is the bid-in cost of generator i at bus m in
interval t, assumed to be convex and piecewise linear (or
quadratic. Vector c ≥ 0 is the vector of line-flow constraints.
Dual variables in (1) play a prominent role in multi-interval
pricing, where λt′ is the dual variable associated with the
power balance equation in interval t′, φ[t′] the dual variables
associated with line constraints, and (µm
it′
, µ¯mit′ , ρ
m
it′
, ρ¯mit′) the
dual variables for the lower and upper limits for ramping and
generation, respectively.
Let (gm∗it′ ) be the solution of the above optimization,
and µm∗
i(t−1)
, µ¯m∗
i(t−1) the optimal dual variables. Under R-ED
policy GR-EDt , the dispatch in the binding interval t is set at
gR-EDmit := g
m∗
it . (2)
Also relevant are the (shadow) ramping prices
(µm∗
i(t−1)
, µ¯m∗i(t−1)) that capture the interdependencies of
decisions across sliding windows. For later references,
define the boundary ramping prices as
µR-ED
mit
:= µm∗
i(t−1)
, µ¯R-EDmit := µ¯
m∗
i(t−1). (3)
In contrast to rolling-window dispatch, the one-shot eco-
nomic dispatch G1-ED produces the dispatch of the entire
scheduling period at once using the solution G∗ of (1) at
t = 1 and window size W = T .
III. ROLLING-WINDOW LMP AND TLMP
A rolling-window pricing policy P = (P1, · · · ,PT ) fol-
lows the same structure as the rolling-window economic dis-
patch. At time t, Pt sets prices at allM buses for the binding
interval t. It may also provide advisory prices for the future
intervals within the pricing window Ht = {t, · · · , t+W−1}.
Here we generalize the standard rolling-window LMP (R-
LMP) policy PR-LMPt and the rolling-window TLMP P
R-TLMP
t de-
rived in Part I for systems with power flow constraints. Both
R-LMP and R-TLMP are marginal cost pricing mechanisms
derived from the R-ED optimization (1); they are by-products
of the R-ED policy.
A. Rolling-window LMP (R-LMP) and Properties
Let the realized price vector in the binding interval t set
by R-LMP be piR-LMP[t] = (piR-LMP1t , · · · , pi
R-LMP
Mt ) where pi
R-LMP
mt is
the uniform price for all generators and demand at bus m.
The R-LMP piR-LMPmt is defined by the marginal cost of
meeting demand dmt at bus m in interval t. From (1) and
by the envelope theorem, we have
pi
R-LMP[t] = ∇d[t]Ft(G) = λ
R-LMP
t 1− S
⊺
φR-LMP[t], (4)
where 1 is a vector of 1’s, λR-LMPt and φ
R-LMP[t] the shadow
prices§ from (1) for the power balance and congestion
constraints in interval t, respectively.
We summarize next main properties of R-LMP. Even
though R-LMP is computed based on the current and future
demand forecasts subject to ramping constraints, properties
of the single-period LMP hold for the multi-interval R-LMP.
1) Energy-congestion price decomposition: The R-LMP
expression (4) shows an explicit energy-congestion price
decomposition, where the first term λR-LMPt is the system-
wide uniform-price of energy for all generators and demands.
The second term S⊺φR-LMP[t] is the congestion-induced price
discrimination at different locations. Note that there are no
ramping prices explicitly shown in R-LMP; the R-LMP
expression is identical to that in the standard single-interval
LMP. The inter-temporal effects of ramping on R-LMP are
hidden in the sequence of R-LMP prices piR-LMP[t].
2) Equilibrium properties: We have shown in Part I that,
for the single-bus network and under the perfect load forecast
assumption, the one-shot economic dispatch GED and LMP
pi
LMP form a general equilibrium. This property holds for
systems with network constraints. Unfortunately, the rolling-
window version of economic dispatch and LMP (gR-ED,piR-LMP)
do not satisfy the general equilibrium condition in general,
even when the load forecasts are accurate; out-of-the-market
uplifts are necessary.
3) ISO’s revenue adequacy: The classical LMP theory for
the single-interval LMP policy [8] states that the ISO has a
non-negative merchandising surplus that covers the system
congestion rent. This result extends to R-LMP under arbitrary
forecast errors when there are ramping constraints.
Proposition 1 (ISO revenue adequacy under R-LMP). For all
(gR-ED[t],piR-LMP[t]) generated by the R-ED and R-LMP policies
under arbitrary forecasting errors, the ISO has non-negative
merchandising surplus
MSR-LMP =
T∑
t=1
c⊺φR-LMP[t] ≥ 0.
Proposition 1 shows that the merchandising surplus from
R-LMP covers and only covers the congestion rent designated
to pay transmission-line owners and financial transmission
right (FTR) holders. There is no extra surplus within the
market settlement to cover the out-of-the-market uplifts de-
signed to ensure dispatch-following incentives. Thus the ISO
is likely to be revenue inadequate under R-LMP when the
ISO has to pay out-of-the-market uplifts.
B. Rolling-window TLMP (R-TLMP) and Properties
As a generalization of R-LMP to a nonuniform marginal-
cost pricing, R-TLMP allows individualized prices for gen-
§When defining prices with Lagrange multipliers, we implicitly assume
that the solutions to the dual optimization are unique.
4erators and demands. Specifically, the R-TLMP at bus m in
interval t is a set of prices
pi
R-TLMP
m [t] = (pi
R-TLMP
m0t , pi
R-TLMP
m1t , · · · , pi
R-TLMP
mNt ),
where piR-TLMPm0t is the price for the demand and pi
R-TLMP
mit the price
for generator i at bus m.
For the demand at bus m in interval t, its R-TLMP piR-TLMPm0t
is defined as the marginal cost to the system to satisfy the
demand dmt —the same definition used in LMP:
piR-TLMPm0t :=
∂
∂dˆmt
Ft(G) = pi
R-LMP
mt .
The R-TLMP for generator i at bus m, on the other hand, is
defined by the marginal benefit of generator producing power
gm∗it . In other words, generator i is treated as an inelastic
negative-demand set at the R-ED solution to (1), i.e., gmit =
gm∗it . As defined in Part I,
piR-TLMPmit := −
∂
∂gmit
Fmit (G
∗),
where Fmit (G) = Ft(G)−f
m
it (g
m
it ) is the total generation cost
excluding that from generator i at bus m in interval t. When
the partial derivative above does not exist, a subgradient is
used.
The following proposition generalizes the TLMP expres-
sion in Part I.
Proposition 2 (Price decomposition of R-TLMP). Let
(λ∗t ,φ
∗[t], µm∗
i(t−1)
, µ¯m∗
i(t−1), µ
m∗
it
, µ¯m∗it ) be the optimal values
of the dual variables associated with the constraints in (1).
The R-TLMP for the demand dˆmt at bus m in interval t is
given by
piR-TLMPm0t = λ
∗
t − s
⊺
mφ
∗[t] = piR-LMPmt , (5)
where where sm is the m-th column of the shift-factor matrix
S corresponding to bus m.
The R-TLMP for generator i at busm in interval t is given
by
piR-TLMPmit = λ
∗
t − s
⊺
mφ
∗[t] + ∆m∗it (6)
= piR-LMPmt +∆
m∗
it , (7)
where ∆m∗it = ∆µ
m∗
it −∆µ
m∗
i(t−1), and ∆µ
m∗
it := µ¯
m∗
it −µ
m∗
it
.
Properties of R-TLMP for power systems with network
constraints are summarized next.
1) Energy-congestion-ramping decomposition: The spe-
cific form of R-TLMP in (6) reveals an explicit space-
time decomposition of payment to generators: a system-wide
uniform energy price in λ∗t applies to all generators and de-
mands everywhere, a spatial discriminative price in the form
of location-specific congestion prices in s⊺mφ
∗[t] applying
to all generators and demands at bus m, and a generator-
specific temporal ramping prices in ∆m∗it that serves as a
“penalty” to the generator for its limited ramping capability.
The penalty interpretation of ∆m∗it is especially important for
the incentives of the truthful revelation of ramping limits, as
discussed next.
2) Public-private price decomposition and transparency:
The structure of R-TLMP shown in (7) shows a public
and private price decomposition: the R-LMP part of R-
TLMP captures the standard uniform pricing for the en-
ergy and congestion costs that are transparent to all market
participants. By revealing the R-LMP part of the TLMP,
the system operator can provide the necessary system-wide
pricing signal effectively for market participants.
On the other hand, the ramping price ∆m∗it of R-TLMP
is private; it pertains to the ramping conditions of individual
generators. It is neither necessary nor practical to make this
part of the price transparent. Another interpretation of ∆m∗it
is that it plays the role of uplift payments for uniform prices
that ensures dispatch following incentives for the generator,
except that it is computed within the real-time market. It
is in this interpretation that R-TLMP has the same level of
transparency of all uniform pricing schemes that require out-
of-the-market uplifts.
3) ISO’s revenue adequacy: The space-time decomposi-
tion of R-TLMP provides insights into sources of ISO’s
surplus. To this end, we consider the ideal case of one-shot
TLMP with a perfect load forecast.
Proposition 3 (ISO revenue adequacy under TLMP). Con-
sider the one-shot economic dispatch G1-ED defined in (1) with
t = 1, W = T and perfect demand forecast. Let the solution
of the dual variables associated with the constraints be
(λ∗t ,φ
∗[t], µm∗
it
, µ¯m∗it ). The total ISO merchandising surplus
decomposes into ramping and congestion surpluses:
MSTLMP = MSramp +MScon, (8)
where
MSramp =
∑
m,i,t
(µ¯m∗it r¯
m
i + µ
m∗
it
rmi ) ≥ 0, (9)
MScon =
∑
t
c⊺φ∗[t] ≥ 0. (10)
The above proposition does not generalize to the rolling-
window TLMP policy, unfortunately. There are indeed cases
when TLMP does not guarantee revenue adequacy (after
the congestion surplus is removed). Nonetheless, simulations
show that the shortfall in TLMP is considerably smaller than
those of its alternatives.
4) Ramping price as a penalty for inadequate ramping:
Note that the TLMP and LMP have the same demand price
(thus the same revenue) and the same congestion surplus.
From (8) and the fact that MSLMP = MScon, the total generator
payment under TLMP must be less than that under LMP. The
following proposition suggests that the ramping price ∆m∗it
of TLMP plays the role of penalty for inadequate ramping.
Proposition 4 (Revenue gap under LMP and TLMP). Con-
sider the one-shot economic dispatch G1-ED defined in (1),
and let (gm∗it , µ
m∗
it
, µ¯m∗it ) be the solution of the primal and
dual variables associated with generator i at bus m and
5interval t. If¶ µm∗i0 = µ
m∗
iT = 0, then the revenue difference
for delivering (gm∗it , t = 1, · · · , T ) under LMP and TLMP is
nonnegative and
RLMPmi −R
TLMP
mi = r¯
m
i
∑
t
µ¯m∗it + r
m
i
∑
t
µm∗
it
≥ 0.
For an interpretation, consider two generators at the same
bus with the same generation level. One generator has
high ramping limits so that there are no binding ramping
constraints; the other has binding ramping constraints. Under
LMP, the two generators receive the same payment. Propo-
sition 4 shows that, under TLMP, however, the one with
high ramping limits receives a higher payment than the one
having binding ramping constraints. This suggests that it is
to the generator’s benefit not to under-report its ramping
limit, and the generator is incentivized to improve its ramping
capability. This insight is validated in simulations in Sec V.
5) Equilibrium properties: The strong equilibrium prop-
erty of R-TLMP shown in Part I holds when network con-
straints are imposed. Under TLMP, there is no incentive for
any generator to deviate from the dispatch signal regardless
of the accuracy of demand forecast and no need for out-of-
the-market uplifts.
Proposition 5 (Strong equilibrium property of TLMP). For
every load forecast, let GR-ED and piR-TLMP be the rolling-
window economic dispatch and the rolling-window TLMP,
respectively. Then (GR-ED,piR-TLMP) satisfies the strong equilib-
rium conditions that result in zero LOC uplifts.
IV. RELATED BENCHMARK PRICING POLICIES
We present here several benchmark pricing policies that
also use the same rolling-window dispatch model. Missing
in the discussion is the flexible ramping product (FRP)
that has been implemented in CAISO because FRP uses
a different optimization procedure that produces different
dispatch signals. The development here follows [4], [5], [9].
A. Price-Preserving Multi-interval Pricing (PMP)
Unlike LMP and TLMP that derive prices from R-ED,
PMP [3], [4] employs a separate pricing optimization aimed
at minimizing the uplift payment.
The rolling-window PMP policy GR-PMPt at time t sets
uniform prices piR-PMP[t] in the binding interval t using (i) the
past rolling-window PMP prices|| (piR-PMP[t−1], · · · ,piR-PMP[1])
and (ii) the demand forecasts (dˆ[t], · · · , dˆ[t+W − 1]) in the
look-ahead window.
¶The assumption µm∗i0 = µ
m∗
iT
= 0 has minimum impact for large T
and becomes innocuous if the initial and final ramping constraints can be
relaxed.
||In practical implementation, one may include only a few past decision
intervals.
At time t, let G =
[
g[1], · · · , g[t + W − 1]
]
be all the
generation variables involved in the past, current, and look-
ahead intervals. The rolling-window PMP policy GR-PMPt solves
the following optimization:
GR-PMPt : at time t,
minimize
G∈G R-PMP
F (G)−
∑t−1
t′=1 q
⊺[t′]piR-PMP[t′]
subject to: for all t ≤ t′ < t+W
q [t′] = (
∑
i g
1
it′ , · · · ,
∑
i g
M
it′ ),
λt′ : 1
⊺q [t′] = 1⊺dˆ[t′]
φ[t′] : S(q [t′]− dˆ[t′]) ≤ c,
(11)
where G R-PMP represents the set of individual generation
constraints such as ramp and generation limits. See Appendix
F of this paper.
The rolling-window PMP sets the price for generation in
interval t by
pi
R-PMP[t] = λR-PMPt 1− S
⊺
φR-PMP[t], (12)
where λR-PMPt and φ
R-PMP[t] are the multipliers associated with
power balance and line-flow constraints in (11).
Note that the objective function can be written as
t+W−t∑
t′=1
∑
m,i
fmit′(g
m
it′)−
t−1∑
t′=1
∑
m,i
(piR-PMPmit′g
m
it′ − f
m
it′(git′))
where the first term is the (bid-in) generation cost in the
look-ahead window. Ignoring the first term, the second term
(without the negative sign) represent the estimate of the total
surplus (including the LOC uplifts) up to time t− 1.
B. Constraint-Preserving Multi-interval Pricing (CMP)
CMP [4] is another policy that generates uniform prices
in a separate optimization different from the rolling-window
economic dispatch. Instead of involving past settled prices
in PMP, CMP enforces the ramping constraints between the
rolling-window economic dispatch and the dispatch variables
used in the pricing models.
The rolling-window CMP policy GR-CMPt at time t sets prices
pi
R-CMP[t] in the binding interval t using (i) the past rolling-
window economic dispatch gR-ED[t − 1], (ii) shadow prices
from (1) (µR-ED
mit
, µ¯R-EDmit) that tie generation between intervals
t− 1 and t, and (iii) load forecasts (dˆ[t], · · · , dˆ[t+W − 1])
in the look-ahead window.
Let G =
[
g[t], · · · , g[t+W − 1]
]
be the generation vari-
ables within the W -interval lookahead window, and Ft(G)
the total cost of generation. The rolling-window CMP policy
GR-CMPt solves the following optimization:
GR-CMPt : at time t,
minimize
G∈G R-CMP
Ft(G) +
∑
m,i(µ¯
R-ED
mit − µ
R-ED
mit
)gmit
subject to: for all t ≤ t′ < t+W
q[t′] = (
∑
i g
1
it′ , · · · ,
∑
i g
M
it′ ),
λt′ : 1
⊺q [t′] = 1⊺dˆ[t′]
φ[t′] : S(q [t′]− dˆ[t′]) ≤ c,
(13)
6where G R-CMP represents the set of individual generation
constraints. See Appendix F of of this paper.
Let λR-CMPt ,φ
R-CMP[t] be the dual variable solution to the
above optimization associated with the power balance equa-
tion and line flow constraints, respectively. The rolling-
window CMP set the price at bus m and interval t by
pi
R-CMP[t] = λR-CMPt 1−S
⊺
φR-CMP[t]. (14)
C. Multi-settlement LMP (MLMP)
The multi-settlement LMP extends the two-settlement
LMP used in the day-ahead and real-time markets to the
rolling-window dispatch setting.
Time
PSfrag replacements
Settlement 1
Ht∗−2
Settlement 2
Ht∗−1
Settlement W
Ht∗
t∗t
∗
− 1t∗ − 2
gˆ
m,1
it∗
pˆi
m,1
t∗
gˆ
m,2
it
pˆi
m,2
t∗
gˆ
m,W
it∗
pˆi
m,W
t∗
Fig. 1: Rolling-window dispatch with window size
W = 3. The final generation and payments are
determined in W = 3 settlements, each produces
the generation quantities and prices for deviation
from the quantity in the previous settlement.
We use Fig. 1 to illustrate the settlement process for
generation and demand in interval t∗. When pricing the W -
interval rolling-window dispatch gR-EDmit∗ for generator i at bus
m, we considerW settlements fromW sequential “markets”,
one for each sliding window that includes interval t∗ as
shown in Fig. 1.
The first settlement occurs at time t = t∗ −W + 1 with
scheduling window Ht∗−W+1 = {t
∗ −W + 1, · · · , t∗}. Let
gˆ
m,1
it∗ be the advisory dispatch for generator i at bus m in
interval t∗ computed by the W−-interval economic dispatch
(1) and pˆi
m,1
t∗ its LMP. Here the superscript “1” indicates
that this is the first market that the dispatch in interval t∗
is settled financially. The first financially binding settlement
for generator i at bus m is pˆi
m,1
t∗ × gˆ
m,1
it∗ ($) for the advisory
dispatch gˆm,1it∗ in interval t
∗. (This settlement is analogous to
the day-ahead settlement in the two-settlement process.)
The second settlement for generator i at bus m occurs
at time t∗ − W + 2 using the rolling-window dispatch
over scheduling window Ht∗−W+1. Let (gˆ
m,2
it∗ , pˆi
m,2
it∗ ) be the
dispatch-LMP pair computed by the economic dispatch over
Ht∗−W+2. The second financially binding settlement for
generator i at bus m is pˆi
m,2
t∗ × (gˆ
m,2
it∗ − gˆ
m,1
it∗ ) ($) for the
advisory dispatch of gˆ
m,2
it∗ in interval t
∗.
As the window slides forward one interval at a time,
the process generates a sequence of W dispatch-LMP pairs
(gˆm,1it∗ , pˆi
m,1
t∗ ), · · · , (gˆ
m,W
it∗ , pˆi
m,W
t∗ ) for generator i at bus m.
In the last settlement occurs at time t = t∗ when generator
i at bus m physically delivers gˆ
m,W
it∗ = g
R-ED
mit∗ and receives
the final settlement pˆi
m,W
t∗ ×(gˆ
m,W
it∗ − gˆ
m,W−1
it∗ ) ($). Note that
pˆi
m,W
t∗ = pi
R-LMP
m,t .
Under the multi-settlement LMP, the total revenue RM-LMPmit∗
for generator i at bus m for delivering power gR-EDmit∗ is
RM-LMPmit∗ = pˆi
m,1
t∗ (gˆ
m,1
it∗ ) +
W∑
k=2
pˆi
m,k
t∗ (gˆ
m,k
it∗ − gˆ
m,k−1
it∗ ). (15)
Note that, although RM-LMPmit∗ is a linear function with respect to
(gˆm,1it∗ , · · · , gˆ
m,W
it∗ ), it is not linear with respect to the power
delivered gR-EDmit∗ in interval t
∗.
V. PERFORMANCE
We present here simulation results involving three genera-
tors at a single bus. Simulations for larger networks including
one involving an ISO-NE 8-zone 76 generators can be found
in the appendix of this paper. As concept demonstrations,
these small setups, although not realistic in practice, are
sufficiently complex to reveal non-trivial characteristics of
multi-interval dispatch and pricing.
A. Simulation settings
The top part of Fig 2 shows the parameters of the genera-
tors and a ramping path used in the simulations. Specifically,
we evaluated the performance of benchmark schemes by
varying ramping limits of G2 and G3 along the path from
scenario A to H while fixing the ramping limits of generator
G1 to 25 MW/h. Scenario A had the most stringent ramping
constraints and H the most relaxed.
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Fig. 2: Top left: generator parameters. The ramp limit for
G1 is fixed at 25 (MW/h). Top right: a path of
ramping events. Bottom left: average demand.
Bottom right: demand traces.
The bottom part of Fig 2 shows the 300 realizations
and average demand over 24 hour period generated from a
7CAISO load profile and a standard deviation of 4% of the
mean value. We used a standard forecasting error model**
where the demand forecast dˆ(t+k)|t of dt+k at time t had
error variance kσ2 increasing linearly with k.
All simulations were conducted with rolling-window opti-
mization over the 24-hour scheduling period, represented by
24 time intervals. And the window size is four intervals in
each rolling window optimization.
B. Dispatch-following and ramping-revelation incentives
1) LOC and dispatch-following incentives: We first con-
sidered dispatch incentives measured by the LOC payment;
the greater the LOC payment, the higher the incentive to
deviate the dispatch signal (in the absence of LOC payment).
The computation of LOC for the pricing models followed
that defined in Part I of the paper and given in detail in the
appendix of this paper.
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Fig. 3: Left panel: LOC vs. ramping scenarios from A to H at σ = 6%.
Right panel: LOC for ramping scenario A under forecast error
variance σ = 0%, 0.1%, 0.6%, 6%.
Fig. 3 shows the total LOC payment from the ISO to
generators at different ramping rates along the ramping
trajectory in Fig. 2. Notice the general trend that all schemes
converged to zero as scenarios of binding ramping constraints
diminished at scenario H.
As predicted by the equilibrium property, the LOC for
TLMP was strictly zero, and all other pricing schemes had
positive LOC payments. PMP designed to minimize the LOC
appeared to have the least LOC among the rest of the uniform
pricing schemes. The same conclusion held for the larger
scale simulations considered in the appendix. Shown also
in Fig. 3 is that LOC increased with the forecasting error
variance, as expected.
2) Truthful revelation of ramping limits: This simulation
aimed at illustrating incentives of the truthful revelation of
ramping limits under various pricing schemes. We varied the
revealed ramping limit of one generator and kept the others
fixed at the true ramp limits.
Fig. 4 shows the generator profit as a function of its
revealed ramping limits for the ramping scenario H with true
ramp limits as 25 MW/h for G1, 60 MW/h for G2 and G3.
Under TLMP, profits of all generators grew as the revealed
**The forecast dˆ(t+k)|t at t of demand dt+k is dˆ(t+k)|t = dt+k +∑k
i=1 ǫk where ǫk is i.i.d. Gaussian with zero mean and variance σ
2.
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Fig. 4: Generator profit vs. revealed ramp limit at σ = 6% for ramp
scenario H. Left: ramp limits of G2 and G3 are fixed at 60
MW/h. Middle: ramp limit of G1 is fixed at 25 MW/h and G3 at
60 MW/h. Right: ramp limits of G1 is fixed 25 MW/h and G2 at
60 MW/h.
ramping limits grew to their true values. The implication was
that the generators had incentives to reveal their ramp limits
truthfully and to improve their ramping capabilities. For the
rest of uniform pricing schemes, the profits of generators G2
and G3 increased as the revealed ramp limits deviate from
their true values, implying that generators had incentives to
under-report their ramp limits.
C. Revenue adequacy of ISO
Fig. 5 shows the ISO’s merchandising surplus that included
the LOC payments. The results validated the fact that uniform
pricing schemes, in general, have positive LOC, resulting
in a deficit for the ISO. As a regulated utility, any deficit
(and surplus) was redistributed to the consumers in a revenue
reconciliation process [10].
For TLMP, the ramping charge on generators led to a pos-
itive merchandising surplus, as shown in Proposition 3. The
simulations involving a a larger network in the appendix also
showed that the rolling-window TLMP had a merchandising
surplus from both ramping and congestion. Coupled with the
fact TLMP always had zero LOC, TLMP showed a positive
merchandising surplus.
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Fig. 5: ISO surplus vs. ramp limits. Left panel: ISO surplus evaluated at
σ = 6%. Right panel: Ramping scenario A.
The ISO surpluses for all pricing schemes converged to the
congestion rent (which was zero in the single-node case) as
ramping events diminished with increasing ramping limits.
For TLMP, the ISO surplus decreased from the positive
because ISO collected less penalty charges to generators. The
ISO surpluses for all other pricing schemes increased from
the negative because of the decreasing LOC payments.
8D. Consumer payments and generator profits
We assumed that ISO was financially neutral; when the
ISO had a positive surplus (after excluding the congestion
surplus), the consumers received a price reduction as a rebate.
When the ISO had a deficit, the consumers paid additional
to cover the deficit.
Fig. 6 shows the consumer payments under the assump-
tion that the demand is credited (or charged) for any ISO
surplus (or deficit). TLMP was the least expensive for the
consumer and PMP the least expensive among uniform
pricing schemes. The decreasing trend of consumer payments
with less ramping constraints under uniform pricing schemes
was due to the decreasing costs of LOC payments to the
generators. The initial increasing trend of consumer payment
under TLMP was due to the less surplus of ISO passed to the
consumers for collecting penalties from generators. Again,
the consumer payments increased with the forecasting error.
The total generator profit figures have identical trends as
those of consumer payments because the operator has zero
surplus. TLMP had the least generator profits, and PMP had
the least generator profits among uniformly priced schemes.
Note that the forecasting errors resulted in higher generator
profits for LMP, CMP, and MLMP because of high LOC
payments to generators.
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Fig. 6: Consumer payment vs. ramp. Left panel: consumer payment
evaluated at σ = 6%. Right panel: Ramping scenario A.
E. Price volatility
The volatility of a random price in an hour can be
measured by the standard deviation of the price normalized
by the average of the price in the hour. A highly volatile
price makes LMP forecasting difficult.
Fig. 7 includes a table of price volatility averaged over all
hours. Among the compared pricing mechanisms, TLMP††
showed consistently lower volatility. We also noticed that
price volatility increased with stricter ramping limits and
increasing demand forecasting errors. The same trend was
also observed in simulations involving larger networks in the
appendix of this paper.
††The normalized standard deviation of TLMP is averaged over for all
the demand and generators.
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Fig. 7: Average ratio of normalized standard deviation of hourly prices.
Top: normalized standard deviation under different ramping
scenarios and standard deviation of forecasting errors. Bottom:
normalized standard deviation at different hours with σ = 6%
(left) and σ = 0 (right).
VI. CONCLUSION
This two-part paper considers the pricing of multi-interval
dispatch under demand forecast uncertainty. We establish
that, to provide dispatch-following incentives, discrimination
in the form of uniform pricing with out-of-the-market uplifts
or nonuniform pricing becomes necessary. In particular, we
show that, as a generalization of LMP, the nonuniform TLMP
eliminates the need for the out-of-the-market uplifts under
arbitrary forecasting uncertainty. We also consider incentives
of the truthful revelation of ramping limits. We show that,
by penalizing the ramping limits, TLMP provides incentives
for generators to improve its ramping capability and reveal
the actual ramping limits. Unfortunately, such incentives are
lacking in the existing pricing schemes.
Under the rolling-window dispatch, different pricing
schemes differ in the distribution of the overall social wel-
fare among generators and consumers. Among the pricing
mechanisms considered in this paper, TLMP leads to the
least consumer payment but also the lowest generator profit.
Likewise, among uniform pricing schemes, PMP leads to the
least consumer payment and the lowest generator profits.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Let qR-ED[t] be the vector of injections in interval t from
the R-ED policy. From (4), the ISO surplus is given by
MSR-LMP :=
T∑
t=1
(d[t]− qR-ED[t])⊺(λR-LMPt 1−S
⊺
φR-LMP[t])
=
T∑
t=1
(qR-ED[t]− d[t])⊺S⊺φR-LMP[t]
=
T∑
t=1
c⊺φR-LMP[t],
where the last equality uses the complementary slackness
condition of (1). 
B. Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of Proposition 2 follows directly from the Proof
of Proposition 3 in Part I. See [6].
C. Proof of Proposition 3
The proof of Proposition 3 follows that of Proposition 1.
D. Proof of Proposition 4
Because Proposition 4 focuses on the payment to generator
i at bus m, we drop the subscripts i and superscript m in the
relevant notations.
∆R := RLMP −RTLMP
=
T∑
t=1
(piLMPt − pi
TLMP)g∗t
=
T∑
t=1
∆µ∗t−1g
∗
t −
T∑
t=1
∆µ∗t g
∗
t
=
T∑
t=1
∆µ∗t−1(g
∗
t − g
∗
t−1) + ∆µ
∗
0g
∗
0 −∆µ
∗
T g
∗
T
=
T∑
t=1
∆µ∗t−1(g
∗
t − g
∗
t−1).
By the complementary slackness condition,
∆µ∗t (g
∗
t+1 − g
∗
t ) =


µ¯∗t r¯i g
∗
t+1 − g
∗
t = r¯
µ∗
t
ri g
∗
t+1 − g
∗
t = −r
0 otherwise
= µ¯∗t r¯ + µ
∗
t
r ≥ 0.

E. Proof of Proposition 5
The proof of Proposition 5 follows exactly the proof of
Theorem 4 given in Appendix F of [6].
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F. Pricing optimization of PMP and CMP
1) Optimization in PMP: The rolling-window PMP policy
GR-PMPt solves the following optimization:
GR-PMPt : at time t,
minimize
{G}
F (G)−
∑t−1
t′=1 q
⊺[t′]piR-PMP[t′]
subject to: Network constraints:
q[t′] = (
∑
i g
1
it′ , · · · ,
∑
i g
M
it′ ),
λt′ : 1
⊺q [t′] = 1⊺dˆ[t′]
φ[t′] : S(q [t′]− dˆ[t′]) ≤ c
for all t ≤ t′ < t+W .
Generation constraints:
(µm
it′
, µ¯mit′) : −r
m
i ≤ g
m
i(t′+1) − g
m
it′ ≤ r¯
m
i ,
(ρm
it′
, ρ¯mit′) : 0 ≤ g
m
it′ ≤ g¯
m
i
for all m, 0 < t′ < t+W .
(16)
The rolling-window PMP sets the price for generation in
interval t by
pi
R-PMP[t] = λR-PMPt 1− S
⊺
φR-PMP[t], (17)
where λR-PMPt and φ
R-PMP[t] are the multipliers associated with
power balance and line-flow constraints in (16).
2) Optimization in CMP: LetG =
[
g[t], · · · , g[t+W−1]
]
be the generation variables within the W -interval lookahead
window, and Ft(G) the total cost of generation. The rolling-
window CMP policy GR-CMPt solves the following optimization:
GR-CMPt : at time t,
minimize
{G}
Ft(G) +
∑
m,i(µ¯
R-ED
mit − µ
R-ED
mit
)gmit
subject to: Network constraints:
q [t′] = (
∑
i g
1
it′ , · · · ,
∑
i g
M
it′ ),
λt′ : 1
⊺q [t′] = 1⊺dˆ[t′]
φ[t′] : S(q [t′]− dˆ[t′]) ≤ c
for all t ≤ t′ < t+W .
Generation constraints:
−rmi ≤ g
m
i(t′+1) − g
m
it′ ≤ r¯
m
i ,
0 ≤ gmit′ ≤ g¯
m
i ,
for all m, t ≤ t′ < t+W .
boundary ramping constraints:
−rmi ≤ g
m
it − g
R-ED
mi(t−1) ≤ r¯
m
i .
(18)
G. Computation of LOC
1) Single settlement prices: For the single settlement
pricing schemes, the computation of LOC is with respect to
a specific generator under dispatch vector g = (g1, · · · , gT )
and price vector pi = (pi1, · · · , piT ). The LOC associated
with pi is given by
LOC(pi) = Q(pi)− (pi⊺g − F (g)) (19)
where F (g) =
∑
t ft(gt) is the total (true) cost of generating
g , and Q(pi) is the post-uplift generator-surplus defined by
Q(pi) = maximize
p=(p1,··· ,pT )
∑T
t=1(pitpt − ft(pt))
subject to g ≤ pt ≤ g¯
−r ≤ p(t+1) − pt ≤ r¯.
(20)
Using (19-20), the computation of LOC under the rolling-
window version of LMP, TLMP, PMP,and CMP are made by
substituting g by the rolling-window dispatch gR-ED and pi by
the rolling-window of the corresponding prices. 
2) Multi-settlement prices: For the multi-settlement pric-
ing such as MLMP, note that the generator can only affect the
revenue by setting the dispatch in the binding interval. There-
fore, in calculating LOCM-LMP, the only decision variables are
the realized generations.
Let g˜t be the pre-binding dispatch of interval t, i.e., , g˜t is
the advisory dispatch level gˆ
m,W−1
it for generator i at bus m
in the (W−1)th settlement as shown in Fig. 1. The generator
profit maximization problem is given by
Q(piM-LMP) = maximize
p=(p1,··· ,pT )
∑T
t=1(pi
R-LMP
t (pt − g˜t)− ft(pt))
subject to g ≤ pt ≤ g¯
−r ≤ p(t+1) − pt ≤ r¯.
Since g˜t is given, the above optimization has the same
solution as p∗ as that of (20) for R-LMP using piR-LMP
(although the values of the two optimization are different).
The LOC for MLMP is therefore
LOCM-LMP =
T∑
t=1
(
piR-LMPt (p
∗
t − gt(t−1))− ft(p
∗
t )
)
−
( T∑
t=1
piR-LMPt (g
R-ED
t − gt(t−1))− F (g
R-ED)
)
= LOCR-LMP ≥ 0.
Fig. 8: Left panel: the 3-node-2-transmission line case. Right panel:
average load demand and ramping scenarios (The ramping limit
for G1 is fixed at 300MW/h).
H. Simulation results for a system with network constraints
We considered a three-generator two-transmission line
network abstracted from the 8-zone ISO New England (ISO-
NE) case shown in Fig. 8. Base on an ISONE load data
profile, 300 load scenarios were generated as in the single
bus case. The standard deviation of the one-step forecasting
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error was set at σ = 0.6%. Other settings in these simulations
are similar to the one-node case unless otherwise specified.
Pricing performance was evaluated with varying ramping
limits. Line capacity of Line 1 (L1) was 1000MW, and
Line 2 (L2) was always congestion-free. The ramp limits of
generations G2 and G3 varied along the path from scenario
A to E with A having the most stringent ramping constraints
and E the most relaxed.
Conclusions drawn for the single-node cases held mostly in
simulations involving a network with power flow constraints.
We provide here additional comments, especially related to
congestions.
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Fig. 9: Top left: LOC vs. ramping scenarios from A to E. The other
figures are individual generator profit vs. its revealed ramp limit.
The true ramp limits are 300 MW/h for G1, 500 MW/h for G2
and G3.
1) Dispatch-following and ramping-revelation incentives:
Fig. 9 shows measures of incentives. The top left panel of
Fig. A2 shows the total LOC payment at different ramping
rates along the ramping trajectory in Fig. 9. As shown in
Proposition 5, the strong equilibrium property of TLMP
dictated that its LOC strictly zero. All other pricing schemes
had LOC with PMP having the least amount. The LOC
converged when ramping constraints vanished at scenario E.
In evaluating incentives for generators to reveal its ramping
limits truthfully, we fixed all but one generator at their true
ramp limits and varied the revealed ramping limits of a single
generator. The three figures in Fig. 9 show that only TLMP
received the highest profit when the revealed ramp limit
matched with the actual value. There are incentives for G2
and G3 to under-report ramping limits for all other pricing
schemes.
2) Revenue adequacy of ISO : The revenue adequacy ISO
when the network is in congestion needs to take into account
congestion rent. The total ISO surplus is thus given by
ISO surplus = Payment from demand− Congestion rent
−Payment to generators (inc LOC).
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Fig. 10: Left: ISO surplus without excluding congestion
rent. Right: ISO surplus after excluding
congestion rent.
Fig. 10 shows the surplus of ISO without excluding
(left) congestion rent and after excluding (right) congestion
rent. Before the congestion rent was excluded, all pricing
mechanisms showed a positive surplus for ISO, indicating
that demand payments include substantial congestion-related
payments. Note also that all pricing schemes converged to the
congestion rent as ramping limits diminished under scenario
E.
After congestion rent was removed, uniform pricing
schemes had a noticeable negative ISO surplus. Under TLMP,
ISO remained to be revenue adequate for all cases except
under scenario C where there was a small deficit. Note that
this is not in contradiction to Proposition 3 where the single-
shot dispatch and perfect forecasting are assumed.
3) Consumer payments and generator profits: Fig 11
shows the consumer payments (left) and generator profits
(right) under the assumption that the operator charges its
shortfall (and returns its profit) to consumers. Note that
consumer payments and generator profits were strongly de-
pendent; the lower the consumer payment was, the lower
generator payments were.
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Fig. 11: Left: consumer payment vs ramping limits. Right:
surplus of generators vs ramping limits.
Consumer payments under TLMP were shown to be the
lowest. Unlike the single-node case, LMP had the least con-
sumer payment among uniform pricing schemes. Note also
that, except for LMP, all uniform pricing schemes resulted
in decreasing consumer payments when ramping constraints
were relaxed from A to E. The consumer payment for TLMP
increased along the same path of ramping scenarios. These
trends were consistent with the single-node case. The trend
for LMP, however, did not follow that in the single-node case
due to a complicated interaction of congestion and ramping
constraints.
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Fig. 12: Normalized Standard Deviation of Hourly Prices
under σ = 0.6% and ramping scenario A.
4) Price volatility: The price volatility was evaluated
under both ramping and congestion constraints. Fig. 12
shows that the average price standard deviation table under
strict (A), relaxed (E), and unconstrained (H) ramping limit
scenarios. The price standard deviation in the table was
averaged over the 24-hour period whereas the two figures
below are the hourly average price standard deviation.
The same conclusions as in the single node case held. For
the most part, TLMP appeared to be the least volatile among
pricing schemes evaluated in this paper.
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Fig. 13: Left: ISO-NE system. Right: Load scenarios at
NE Mass & Boston and ramping scenarios
I. Simulation results for the 76 generator ISO-NE system
We considered the 8-zone ISO New England (ISO-NE)
case with 76-generator and 12-transmission line shown in
Fig. 13 with parameters from [11], [12]. All line capacities
were set at 1000MW. Monte Carlo simulations of 200 load
scenarios were conducted with normalized standard deviation
of the one-step forecasting error set at σ = 0.6%. Other
settings in these simulations were similar to the one-node
case unless otherwise specified.
Pricing performance was evaluated with varying ramping
limits. In the ISO-NE data set, there were two groups of
generators with different ramping limits. The ramping limit
of Group 1 varied from 30MW/h to 120MW/h and that of
Group 2 varied from 100MW/h to 700MW/h. From Fig. 13,
the ramp limits of generators in two groups varied along the
path from scenario A to F with A having the most stringent
ramping constraints and F the most relaxed.
Conclusions drawn from previous single-node cases and
three-generator two-transmission line cases mostly held for
the ISO-NE simulations. Here we highlight some of the
differences in the ISO-NE test cases from the previous
smaller-scale simulations.
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Fig. 14: Left: LOC vs. ramping scenarios from A to F. Right: under
scenario A, the profit change of one generator when its ramp
limits was changed by 10%.
1) Dispatch-following and ramping-revelation incentives:
As is shown on the left panel of Fig. 14, only TLMP
supported dispatch-following incentives with strictly zero
LOC, as expected from Proposition 5. This simulation also
showed that the average LOC decreased dramatically from
ramping setting A to B where ramp limits of generators
in Group 1 increased from 30MW to 60MW. See also the
performance in the magnified LOC plot for the ramping path
from B to F.
For the truthful revelation of ramping limits, the right panel
of Fig. 14 shows the scatter plot of the profit change of a
generator when its ramp limits was increased by 10% while
others were truthful. When the profit change was negative, it
meant that the the generator had incentive not to reveal the
true ramp limit. Among the five benchmark pricing schemes,
TLMP had the smallest number of non-incentive compatible
cases.
2) Revenue adequacy of ISO: Fig. 15 shows the mer-
chandising surplus of ISO with (left) and without (right)
congestion rent. Once congestion rent is removed, TLMP was
the only one with positive surplus over the entire ramping
path with the highest surplus when ramp limits were tight
(scenario A and B). The order of the rest of benchmarks in
this larger network was not entirely consistent with the three
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generator case. Most noticeably was that PMP had the least
surplus for the tight ramp case (A) and the highest for the
less ramp-limited scenarios (C and D).
A B C D E F
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
S
u
rp
lu
s
 o
f 
IS
O
 (
$
)
10
7
PMP CMP LMP
TLMP MLMP
B C D E F
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
10
7
A B C D E F
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
S
u
rp
lu
s
 o
f 
IS
O
 e
x
c
lu
d
e
d
 L
in
e
 R
e
n
t 
($
)
10
7
PMP CMP LMP
TLMP MLMP
B C D E F
-2
-1
0
1
10
6
Fig. 15: Left: ISO surplus without excluding congestion
rent. Right: ISO surplus after excluding
congestion rent.
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Fig. 16: Left: consumer payment vs ramping limits. Right:
surplus of generators vs ramping limits.
Ramping limit scenario A D F
Load forecast error σ=0% σ=0.6% σ=0% σ=0.6% σ=0% σ=0.6%
TLMP 0.2401 0.3361 0.1852 0.1869 0.1467 0.1467
LMP/MLMP 0.2688 0.3840 0.1899 0.1917 0.1467 0.1467
PMP 0.3818 0.3722 0.1861 0.1858 0.1467 0.1467
CMP 0.4801 0.5264 0.1989 0.2017 0.1467 0.1467
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Fig. 17: Normalized Standard Deviation of Hourly Prices
under σ = 0.6% and ramping sceanrio A.
3) Consumer payments and generator profits: Fig 16
shows the consumer payments (left) and generator profits
(right) under the assumption that the operator charges its
shortfall (and returns its profit) to consumers.
As expected, the consumer payment and generator revenue
were strongly correlated. Unlike previous small case studies,
consumer payments and generator profit under PMP for the
76 generator case were the lowest for scenario A and the
highest for scenarios C and D. MLMP had the lowest total
consumer payment and generator profit for scenarios B, C,
D, and E.
4) Price volatility: The price volatility was evaluated
under different ramping constraints and load forecast errors
with network congestion considered. Fig. 17 shows that
the average price standard deviation table under strict (A),
relaxed (D), and unconstrained (F) ramping limit scenarios.
The conclusion here was consistent with previous two small-
scale case studies. For the most part, TLMP appeared to be
the least volatile among pricing schemes evaluated in this
paper.
